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Abstract
The rates of autism diagnoses are increasing, as is the use of technology and online interactions,
both inside and outside of the classroom. These online interactions frequently include a digital
representation of the individual, or avatar. Avatars can take a variety of forms and they can
influence an individual’s perception of the source as well as the message presented (Nowak, Fox,
& Ranjit, 2015). While research indicates that human-looking avatars increase learning and
attention in typically developed populations, initial research suggests that this may not be true for
those with autism (Begum, Serna, & Yanco, 2016; Moore & Calvert, 2000; Parsons & Mitchell,
2001). The present study will examine the effects of perceived anthropomorphism on
information processing, for typically developed individuals and those with ASD. Social
motivation theory predicts that those with ASD will perceive social potential differently than
their typically developed peers (Chevalier et al., 2017), and this can in turn affect perceptions of
anthropomorphism, homophily and copresence. Finally, both information processing theory and
the theory of executive dysfunction predict that differences in perceptions of social potential and
anthropomorphism can influence instructor satisfaction.
Keywords: Autism, executive dysfunction, information processing, anthropomorphism, avatars,
homophily, copresence, instructor satisfaction.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Interactions and transactions involving some form of technology are now a common
occurrence for most people, including both neuro-typical and neuro-diverse individuals,
specifically those with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Many of these technologies provide
individuals with opportunities to interact with others using digital characters. Scientists and
scholars often refer to these digital characters as avatars. Avatars are “a digital representation of
a human user that facilitates interaction with other users, entities, or the environment” (Nowak &
Fox, 2018 pg. 34). Research suggests there are different psychological traits and individual-level
differences that affect the perception of avatars (McGloin, Nowak & Watt, 2014; Nowak &
Rauh, 2005; Nowak, Fox, Ranjit, 2015). Individuals that are on the autism spectrum use avatars
and robot technology to help develop their social skills and attention orientation (Georgescu,
Kuzmanovic, Roth, Bente, & Vogeley, 2014; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2000). Research on
typically developed populations has suggested that perceived anthropomorphism, or the
attribution of human characteristics, can increase perceptions of homophily (Nowak, Hamilton,
& Hammond, 2009), presence, and message clarity (Nowak et al., 2015). However, previous
research findings (Begum et al., 2016; Grynszpan, Martin & Nadel, 2008; Moore & Calvert,
2000; Parsons & Mitchell, 2001) and the theories of executive dysfunction and social motivation
suggest that those with ASD process these digital entities differently from typically developed
individuals.
Those with ASD characteristically process information differently than their typically
developed peers (Carter, Williams, Hodgins, & Lehman, 2014; Jarrold, et al., 2013; Moore,
Cheng, McGrath, & Powell, 2005; Parsons, 2016), and this influences how they use and react to
technology (Carter et al, 2014; Jarrold, et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2005; Parsons, 2016).
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Furthermore, when individuals with ASD are presented with information in a mediated context,
it can positively affect their performance outcomes (Jarrold, et al., 2013; Parsons, 2016),
attention (Carter et al, 2014), social skills (Moore et al., 2005) and decision-making. However, as
a social information training tool, multimedia interfaces (text with dynamic, animated avatars)
were less effective as a training tool for those with ASD than simple interfaces (text with
pictures) (Grynszpan et al., 2008).
When persons with ASD interact with digital characters (Georgescu et al., 2014) and text
chat, they feel more confident than they do offline in their ability to communicate, and they are
better able to discern social cues (Rajendran & Mitchell, 2000). Nonetheless, when presented
with several variations of robots and avatars, in face-to-face and mediated interactions, those
with ASD preferred non-human like characters and robots to more human-like characters
(Begum et al., 2016; Parsons & Mitchell, 2001). Thus, it is important to consider individual
differences and the end-users needs when it comes to developing and applying this technology
(Begum et al., 2016).
Mediated communication can be effective, but the effectiveness can vary with the type of
digital character. While several studies have included digital characters based on what the
researcher perceives to be a more humanlike character, or their opinions of anthropomorphism
(Chaminade et al., 2015; Kristen, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; Sartorato, Przybylowski, & Sarko,
2017), but they have not explicitly measured a participant’s perceptions of anthropomorphism.
Therefore, this project will measure perceptions of anthropomorphism, and the unique reactions
of those with ASD to anthropomorphism as compared to a typically developed population.
Furthermore, this study will test how differences in perceived anthropomorphism affect
perceptions of the source of the message (affective content) or satisfaction with the instructor.
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The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2014 report indicates that one in every
six children (aged 6 to 17) will be diagnosed with one or more developmental disability, such as
attention deficit disorder (ADD), autism spectrum disorders (ASD), learning disabilities, hearing
or vision loss, etc. The rate of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) increased by 119.4 percent since
2000 (1 in 150) to 2010 (1 in 68) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014), and this
trend is likely to continue. While little research in communication and education has addressed
the unique needs of this population, almost half of the individuals identified on the autism
spectrum have average to above-average intellectual abilities (CDC, 2014), and are likely to be
included in the college and university population. Thus, it is important for researchers and
educators to consider how they use these digital characters for teaching those with ASD.
According to the CASA (computers as social actors’ framework) framework, individuals
will process virtual entities similarly to offline entities (Nowak et al., 2015; Reeves & Nass,
1996). Therefore, it is vital to understand the underlying factors that influence the variance in
perceptions of the same digital characters across individuals (Nowak et al., 2015). Thus, this
research will test several relationships: i) investigate the relationship between ASD and
responses to anthropomorphism when viewing human and non-human instructors ii) investigate
the relationship between anthropomorphism, homophily, and perceptions of self and othercopresence for typically developed persons and those with ASD, and iii) the impact of these
variables on and attitudes toward the instructor. The paper includes a discussion of the
differences in information processing for typically developed individuals and those with ASD.
Finally, the paper will address the theoretical and practical implications of the results for
researchers and designers of educational technology, with particular attention paid to designing
systems for those with ASD.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
Information Processing Theory and Executive Dysfunction
Models and theories predicting the differences individuals experience processing and
reacting to messages focus primarily on factors related to attention and comprehension of a
message (Hamilton & Nowak, 2005; McGuire, 1968; Miller, 2011). Information processing
theories and models examine the flow of information. Information processing involves multiple
stages, and the process begins with some input or information that may or may not be lost at any
point during processing (Miller, 2011). Universally, these theories argue that an individual’s
mental processing capacity is finite and limits their ability to attend to message content
(Baddeley, 2000; Munakata, 2006; Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). These theoretical models
make two main predictions: i) people are limited in both the speed and amount of information
that they attended to and, ii) thinking is a flexible process (Miller, 2011; Siegler & Alibali,
2005). Humans inherently have a limited capacity and speed at which they can attend to and
process information simultaneously (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). Therefore, individuals adapt
and allocate resources to control the flow of information based on what they perceive to be
relevant and essential stimuli (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968; Siegler & Alibali, 2005). The
primary factor influencing comprehension is attention and how one chooses to control the
allocation of their limited resources (Hamilton, 1997; Miller, 2011).
Information processing theories posit that there is a positive correlation between an
individual’s ability to attend to and comprehend content, and the impact of the message’s effect
(Hamilton & Nowak, 2005; Miller, 2011). Thus, individuals must first be compelled to allocate
their attention to a message and a source so that information can be used in future situations or
decisions. The channel (e.g., video, audio, face-to-face) one uses, message content, and
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individual receiver level differences in attention and comprehension all affect changes related to
perception, attitude, and opinion of a source or message (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). People
respond to technology with similar categorical responses that they might have to offline entities.
Thus, computer users will assign social rules and expectations to a computer or stimuli that
appear responsive and shows intelligence and emotion (Nowak et al., 2009; Nass & Moon,
2000). The assignment of these human categories is an example of perceptions of social
potential. Accordingly, information-processing theory posits that individuals pay more attention
to sources they see as dynamic or having greater social potential (McGuire, 1968). Attention
allocated to the source of the message could be a distraction for some learners and take away
from the resources they have to evaluate a message.
The information-processing model begins with a message or problem that requires
attention and ends with a person drawing some conclusion about the information presented, or
storing it in long-term memory (Miller, 2011). During the first stage of information processing,
message exposure, yielding or attention to the message, and possible comprehension of the
content may occur (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). During the second stage, an individual may
evaluate both the source and the message content (McGuire, 1968). Information processing
theories hypothesize that as a person’s knowledge increases, so does their involvement in a topic.
Involvement in the topic can lead to a more significant change in behaviors or attitudes
(McGuire, 1968; Hamilton & Nowak, 2005). However, individuals have a fixed and limited
capacity to process this information, and in order for yielding to occur, individuals must be able
to inhibit attention to irrelevant stimuli (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). Furthermore, individuals
are motivated by “enduring dispositions or innate unconscious rules” as to how they will allocate
these resources (Lachman, Butterfield, & Butterfield, 1979). However, many individual
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differences influence this process, and the responses are different for individuals with issues
related to executive function, such as those with ASD (Rajendran et al., 2011; Robinson et al.,
2009).
Autism Spectrum Disorders and Executive Dysfunction
The theory of executive dysfunction focuses on the difficulties that an individual faces
with tasks such as initiating, sustaining, shifting, inhibition, and stopping (Rajendran & Mitchell,
2007). Planning, decision-making, judgment, and self-perception abilities relate to these specific
executive dysfunctions and those diagnosed with ASD (Landry & Taie, 2016; Miyake et al.
2000; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). Taken together with the limited resources that individuals
have available for processing information, individuals that experience problems with these
specific executive functions are at a marked disadvantage. Therefore, when individuals have
trouble with these specific executive functions, and they are processing multiple streams of
information targeted at affective content (a source), and task information (the message), they
may struggle with shifting between the two streams of information.
Many individuals with ASD have trouble with specific executive functions, such as
mental flexibility and self-monitoring (Hill, 2004; Robinson et al., 2009). These functions
correspond to an individual’s planning, decision-making, and judgment skills, as well as their
self-perception (Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). Accordingly, the theory of executive dysfunction
predicts that individuals who have trouble with attention switching, and those with highly
focused interests, will also have trouble in planning, mental flexibility, inhibition, and selfmonitoring (Hill, 2004; Robinson et al., 2009). Therefore, when individuals with ASD struggle
with attention switching and mentalizing, they may have problems shifting their attention
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between information directed at the source and content directed at understanding new
information (Palmer, Paton, Enticott, & Hohway, 2014).
Cognitive overload and information processing theories posit that individuals not only
have a limited capacity for processing information but in the presence of competing stimuli, no
single message will receive sufficient attention for processing (McGuire, 1968; Jeong &
Fishbein, 2007; Mayer & Moreno, 2003; Junco, 2012). When a person encounters more
information than their processing capacity can manage, some of the information may not be
comprehended (Miller, 2011). Thus, when persons with ASD are engaged in processing both
task information (a message) and affective content (the avatar,) they may not process the
information as effectively as typically developed individuals.
Executive dysfunction and attention switching. Many individuals with ASD struggle
with attention switching. Persons that struggle with attention switching have trouble
remaining on task and focusing when trying to attend to multiple sources of information or
stimuli. Those with attention switching problems cannot self-monitor. Self- monitoring helps
individuals direct their attention to the essential information and disregard the less essential
stimuli. Thus, those that struggle with this particular executive function are unable to inhibit
themselves from paying attention to distractions or to information that is not relevant, and they
fight to return their focus if they are distracted. Essentially, this means that people who struggle
with attention switching have difficulty maintaining focus and adjusting behavior when alternate
competing information is present (Hill, 2004; Robinson et al., 2009), and they experience greater
difficulty than their typically developed peers do when moving from one task to the other (Hill,
2004; Rajendran et al., 2011). Therefore, when individuals with ASD are processing an avatar
that they find difficult to process, they may struggle with staying on task and processing the
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message. The competing streams of information may also reduce the satisfaction a person
experiences in a learning environment, or satisfaction with the instructor.
Executive dysfunction and mentalizing. The ability to take into account your mental
state as well as the mental state of others is the ability to mentalize (Rajendran & Mitchell,
2007). Those with ASD often struggle with their ability to discern the mental states of others.
Avatars perceived as more humanlike, responsive, or those that show emotion or intelligence, are
viewed as having greater social potential (Nowak et al., 2015; Nowak et al., 2009). Mentalizing
requires processing information about the social potential of an interaction partner. Individuals
tend to invest more resources in processing avatars that they deem higher in social potential
(Nowak et al., 2009). Therefore, individuals that struggle with mentalizing may struggle more
than typically developed persons when processing an avatar that has greater social potential.
The overarching central assumption of information processing is that attention is a
primary factor in understating (McGuire, 1968; Miller, 2011; Hamilton, 1997). Typicallydeveloped individuals can move easily from one task to another and will devote attention to the
more difficult task. However, individuals with ASD typically struggle when moving fluidly from
one task to another, and will struggle more with controlling the flow of information and
allocating the appropriate level of resources (Mackinlay, Charman & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006;
Rajendran et al., 2011; Logie, Trawley, & Law, 2011; Woodbury-Smith & Volkmar, 2009). A
source that is higher in social potential may serve as more of a distraction for those with ASD.
The visual/social information from the avatar may serve as a competing stream of information
for those that struggle with mentalizing. Participants that struggle with discerning the mental
states of others may find an avatar that is higher in social potential difficult to process. Therefore,
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increased anthropomorphism may serve as a distraction for those that express difficulty with
mentalizing, and taken together, and this may reduce satisfaction with the instructor.
Executive dysfunction and social abilities. Those who struggle with mentalizing and
attention switching may also struggle with social skills and social cognition, including processes
that aid in the understanding of others (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley,
2001; Happé, Cook & Bird, 2017). These processes include but are not limited to, the quantity of
social interaction, emotion recognition, empathy, the degree of attention paid to social stimuli
(Happé et al., 2017). Persons that experience trouble with social skills tend to focus more on the
self and less on engaging with others (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001). Therefore, some individuals
with ASD tend to engage in repetitive and restricted communication (Woodbury-Smith &
Volkmar, 2009).
Fixation on certain social cues or tasks, and the restricted way in which some individuals
with ASD communicate may inhibit their processing. Avatars provide a person with information
about the interaction partner, and a person’s perception of the avatar can influence later social
judgments (Blascovich & Bailenson, 2011; Hamilton & Nowak, 2010; Nowak, Watt, & Walther,
2009; Nowak & Fox, 2018). Even when individuals interact with static two-dimensional images,
the more human they perceive the image to be, the more they see it as having social potential
(Hamilton & Nowak, 2010; Nowak et al., 2009). Thus, individuals with diminished social skills
may find processing a human-looking avatar more challenging than a less human-looking avatar.
Therefore, when tasked with processing the avatar along with an informative message, those
with communication or social skills problems may experience more difficulty in making source
attributions than their typically developed peers may.
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CASA and Social Potential
According to the computers as social actor's (CASA) framework, individuals will apply
the same perception process to mediated stimuli that they would offline stimuli or persons
(Reeves & Nass, 1996; Nowak & Rauh, 2008; Nowak et al., 2015). The CASA framework posits
that when individuals interact with one another, it is "fundamentally social and natural" (Reeves
& Nass, 1996, p. 5), whether online or offline. The first stage in perceiving a digital
representation, or avatar, is determining anthropomorphism, "agency or humanity" (Nowak &
Fox, 2018). People typically feel a stronger connection with avatars that visually represent a
human, and this can also lead to perceptions of greater social potential (Nowak et al., 2015;
Nowak & Fox, 2018). However, when atypical individuals, with social skill impairments, are
processing affective and task-related content with an avatar that they perceive as more human,
they may be distracted by social potential. As a result, they may be unable to provide adequate
attention to both task and affective content, and involvement and working memory may be
impaired. One influential variable in the perception of social potential is the perception of
anthropomorphism, or humanness (Nowak & Fox, 2018). Therefore, understanding what
variables influence the source perception process is vital in constructing a positive learning
environment.
Anthropomorphism is the perception of the appearance or behavioral attributes of humans
(Nowak, 2004; Nowak & Biocca, 2003). Anthropomorphism is a concept frequently used in
avatar research with typically developed populations. The perception of humanness or
anthropomorphism can influence perceptions of social potential (Nowak et al., 2009; Nowak &
Fox, 2018). Furthermore, there are variations in the effects of anthropomorphism across the
literature. In some instances, more anthropomorphic avatars have been deemed less credible and
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likable (Mull, Wyss, Moon & Lee, 2014; Nowak, 2004), while others have found more
anthropomorphic images to be more likable and credible (Bengtsson, Burgoon, Cederberg,
Bonito, & Lundeberg, 1999; Khan & Sutcliffe, 2014; Luo, McGoldrick, Beatty, & Keeling,
2006; Nowak & McGloin, 2014; Wexelblat, 1998).
The differences in perceptions of anthropomorphism, and its effects, may relate to factors
such as previous experience, personality, and other biases. As discussed above, typicallydeveloped people tend to prefer anthropomorphic avatars, but this does not apply to everyone.
Studies suggest that people on the autism spectrum prefer less anthropomorphic or even
zoomorphic animal avatars to anthropomorphic avatars in online learning environments (Carter
et al., 2014; Baron-Cohen, Golan, & Ashwin, 2009). Therefore, greater social potential may not
be a positive attribute for those with ASD. The next section discusses how the social motivation
theory of autism explains that deficits in social abilities and mentalizing that may account for the
preference for less anthropomorphic characters (Chevalier et al., 2017).
Anthropomorphism and ASD
Anthropomorphism is comprised of two motivational mechanisms, effectance, and
sociality (Epely, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). Effectance is the motivation to interact effectively
with non-human agents, and the ability for the interaction to enhance one's predictions of the
stimuli's behavior in the present and future (Epely et al., 2007). The anxiety or uncertainty one
feels about the interaction can influence the degree to which people tend to anthropomorphize a
non-human agent (Epely et al., 2007). Sociality refers to the motivation that a person has to
establish social connections with other humans (Epely et al., 2007). Individuals may perceive a
non-human agent as more anthropomorphic when they feel a lack of social connection to humans
and less anthropomorphic when they feel a strong sense of social connection (Epely et al., 2007).
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Additionally, when individuals with ASD process information from a non-human agent,
they may feel less anxiety about the interaction and a stronger social connection.
The social motivation theory of autism posits that both psychological and biological mechanisms
drive individuals to orient toward social interaction and to seek social reward (Chevalier et al.,
2017). Thus, individuals prefer engaging in social interaction and typically find that interaction
rewarding. However, some individuals with ASD are not as motivated as their typically
developed peers are when engaging in social interaction, and they struggle with interpreting
social cues and mentalizing (Chevalier et al., 2017). Furthermore, interactions with avatars that
have lower social potential may provide those with social and mentalizing deficits the benefit of
simplified social cues and less social stimulations (Chevalier et al., 2017: Scassellati, Admoni &
Mataric, 2012). Therefore, those with less social motivation will experience an overall decrease
in the attentional effort they put forth to interpreting social situations than typically developed
persons.
Based on the social motivation theory of autism and the motivational mechanisms
discussed, a person's social skills and mentalizing ability may affect perceptions of
anthropomorphism. Thus, when individuals struggle more with social interactions and
mentalizing, they will perceive the animal cartoon as more anthropomorphic than those that
score higher in social skills and mentalizing. The following research questions are included.
RQ1: Will people's social skills moderate how anthropomorphic they perceive the
avatars?
RQ2: Will people's mentalizing abilities moderate how anthropomorphic they perceive
the avatars?
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Previous research on the influence of avatars has also considered the importance of
homophily in the perception process (Nowak et al., 2009; Nowak & Rauh, 2005). Homophily
can positively influence the salience of certain attitudes, value judgments, or heuristics, and this
can subsequently affect the formation of perceptions (Kennedy-Lightsey, Madlock, Horan &
Booth-Butterfield, 2008). Furthermore, homophily increases one's confidence in predicting
behaviors (Rimal, Lapinski, Cook, & Real, 2005; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook, 2001;
Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007; Woodbury-Smith & Volkmor, 2009).
Homophily and ASD
Psychological homophily is an expression of similarity between a source and a receiver
through like qualities with an individual or group rather than heterogeneous individuals (Yuan &
Gay, 2006; McCroskey, Richmond & Daly, 1975). Previous research indicates that homophily is
a multidimensional construct concerned with perceived similarity (Yuan & Gay, 2006;
McCroskey et al., 1975). Furthermore, greater homophily can lead to a sense of effective
communication based on perceived similarities (Kennedy-Lightsey et al., 2008).
Homophily can positively influence the connection one feels toward an individual or
group and the attitudes they possess (Rimal et al., 2005; McPherson et al., 2001). The greater the
sense of likeness, the more pleasant, influential, and frequent interactions will be (Prisbell &
Andersen, 1980). Homophily can influence formed attitudes, and therefore, a stronger
connection to an individual will facilitate stronger like attitudes (Aubrey, Behm-Morawitz &
Kim, 2014; Rimal et al., 2005; McPherson et al., 2001). The stronger the connection, the more
confident one is in making predictions about future behavior. As such, predictability allows
individuals to more readily process interactions and reduce apprehension (Ibarra, 1992).
McCroskey, Richmond, and Daly (1975) found that the more homophily a receiver feels toward
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a source, the more communication is likely to occur and be effective. Homophily can also
influence heuristics, or the mental scripts, that influence the formation of perceptions (KennedyLightsey et al., 2008). Thus, when individuals are involved in an online interaction where they
perceive the other to be more like themselves, they may feel their communication is more
productive (Ibarra, 1992; Kennedy-Lightsey et al., 2008; Rourke & McGloin, 2019). Therefore,
perceptions of anthropomorphism will positively influence the degree to which an individual
feels the avatar is similar to them.
H1: Anthropomorphism will positively predict perceptions of homophily.
The implications of perceived similarities within a group and toward an individual are
vast and applied in a variety of contexts by both mass and interpersonal scholars. Research
examining the use of avatars includes the concept of homophily and the impact of perceived
similarity to determine network ties and processes. Additionally, for typically developed
participants, perceptions of anthropomorphism significantly predict their perceptions of
homophily (Nowak et al., 2009; Nowak & Rauh, 2005). However, based on the theory of
executive dysfunction for those that struggle with social skills and mentalizing, a more
anthropomorphic avatar may decrease perceptions of homophily. Therefore, social skills and
mentalizing will moderate the effect of anthropomorphism on homophily. Atypical individuals
may feel a weaker connection with an avatar they perceive to be more anthropomorphic, and this
can facilitate decreased homophily.
H2a: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less homophily when
perceived anthropomorphism is higher than those that score lower on social skills.
H2b: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less homophily when
perceived anthropomorphism is higher than those that score lower on mentalizing.
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Mediated communication research frequently cites presence, or the lack thereof, as an
essential concept and predictor of communication satisfaction. Presence can be defined as a
perception that one has of “being there” and can refer to a psychological connection that one
feels with another person (Nowak & Biocca, 2003). Presence is also frequently cited as a
significant predictor of student-teacher satisfaction (Richardson, Maeda, Lv, & Caskurlu, 2017;
Russo & Benson, 2005; Swan & Shih, 2005) and positive learning outcomes (Elwood et al.,
2014; Garrison, Cleveland-Innes, & Fung, 2010; Hostetter & Busch, 2006; Kehrwald, 2008;
Richardson et al., 2017; Swan & Shih, 2005; Wei & Chen, 2012) for typically developed
students.
Copresence and ASD
Copresence is a dimension of presence that focuses on the sense that individuals feel they
can perceive others and the extent to which they feel that others can actively perceive them
(Biocca, Harms, & Burgoo, 2004; Kehrwald, 2008; Nowak & Biocca, 2003; Sung & Mayer,
2012). Furthermore, copresence indicates a sense of being together and a "psychological
connection of minds" (Biocca, Harms, & Burgoo, 2004; Bulu, 2012; Kehrwald, 2008; Nowak,
2001; Sung & Mayer, 2012). Thus, the term copresence refers explicitly to a psychological
connection that one feels with another person (Nowak & Biocca, 2003), and does not require the
feeling that the user is inside or present in the medium. Additionally, when individuals interact
with an avatar that they feel a similarity, too, this can positively influence the connection that
they feel, and copresence can increase. Therefore, when individuals experience a greater sense of
homophily, they may also feel that the avatar is more salient or copresent.
Research in copresence indicates that measuring copresence necessitates two measures,
one measure targeting their perceptions of the interaction partners' involvement (other-
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copresence), and their involvement in the interaction (Nowak, 2001). Additionally, othercopresence and self-copresence are reciprocal constructs, and in typically developed populations,
perceived other-copresence increases self-copresence (Nowak et al., 2009). Persons that
experience the partner more in the interaction also feel more present themselves. Thus, when a
participant feels the instructor is more involved in the interaction, the participant will also feel
increased involvement in the interaction.
H3: Participants that perceive higher anthropomorphism will report more othercopresence than participants who perceive less anthropomorphism.
However, this same pattern may not replicate with atypical populations. Based on
theories of information processing, typically developed individuals and atypical individuals are
limited in both the speed and amount of information that they can attend to (Miller, 2011; Siegler
& Alibali, 2005). Furthermore, information-processing theories posit that a set of known but
unconscious rules guide where individuals choose to allocate their attention (Lachman et al.,
1979). However, as indicated by the theory of executive dysfunction, this process is more
challenging for individuals with issues related to executive function, such as those with ASD.
Thus, those with ASD will struggle more when faced with processing multiple streams of
information, such as the source (affective content) and content directed at perceived cognitive
learning (task content). Therefore, increased other- copresence may not produce the same
positive effect on self-copresence for those with ASD that it does for typically developed
populations.
The differences in social abilities and mentalizing may account for the difficulty that
those with ASD experience in processing avatars that are more anthropomorphic. Persons with
ASD tend to focus more on the self and less on engaging with others. Thus, the lack of social
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motivation to engage the other, or relate to the others feelings, can inhibit an individual's ability
or desire to experience a sense of involvement or perceptions of other-copresence. Individuals
that struggle with social skills and mentalizing that interact with a more anthropomorphic avatar
may feel challenged in interpreting social cues and be less interested in engaging or feeling
other-copresence. Therefore, individuals that express more difficulty with attention switching,
social skills, and mentalizing will also express decreased perceptions of other-copresence.
H4a: Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less othercopresence when perceived anthropomorphism is higher, than those that that score lower
on attention switching.
H4b: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less other-copresence when
perceived anthropomorphism higher than those that score lower on social skills.
H4c: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less other-copresence when
anthropomorphism is high than those that score lower on mentalizing.
Executive dysfunction and self-copresence
Based on the theory of executive dysfunction and information processing, when
individuals with ASD are processing both an avatar and a message, they will struggle more than
typically developed individuals. Thus, individuals with ASD will struggle with focusing on and
their involvement, or self-copresence, in a mediated interaction.
Attention switching and self-copresence. As described above, those who struggle with
attention switching find processing multiple streams of information, such as an avatar and task
content, more challenging than their typically developed peers do. Additionally, inhibition and
self-monitoring are what help an individual to stay on task when competing streams of
information are present (Hill, 2004; Robinson et al., 2009). Attention switching is directly related
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to one's self-monitoring and inhibition, and as a result, individuals with ASD may experience
difficulty moving from one task to another (Hill, 2004; Rajendran et al., 2011). Accordingly,
when individuals with ASD are processing an avatar that they cannot or do not wish to connect
with (other-copresence), they may struggle with staying on task and processing the message.
However, individuals with ASD prefer animals to humans, and this may be because they may
find them more predictable and less distracting (Scassellati et al., 2012), making them feel
increased self-copresence. Therefore, individuals with ASD will perceive the interaction as less
effective and desire to be less engaged when the source has high social potential or is highly
other-copresent; this will make them want to retreat and may decrease self-copresence.
H5: Other-copresence will positively predict self-copresence.
H6a: Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less self-copresence
when other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on attention switching.
Social skills and self-copresence. Typically developed people feel greater selfcopresence when they can experience other-copresence or that the other is more involved in the
interaction (Biocca et al., 2004; Bulu, 2012; Kehrwald, 2008; Nowak, 2001; Sung & Mayer,
2012). However, as stated earlier, individuals with ASD characteristically struggle with social
interactions and taking another's perspective (Klin, McPartland & Volkmar, 2005; WoodburySmith & Volkmar, 2009), which is predicted by CASA to transfer over to digital others. The
difficulty that those with ASD experience in perspective-taking can inhibit perceptions of othercopresence and then subsequently reduce their sense of involvement in the interaction.
Individuals with ASD tend to prefer interactions with digital others that are animals rather
than human. The desire to interact with these less human-like social avatars may provide those
with social skills deficits fewer social cues to interpret and thereby a less stressful interaction
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(Chevalier et al., 2017: Scassellati et al., 2012). Participants that express difficulty with
interpreting social cues will feel less connected to the instructor when they are interacting with
an avatar that they perceive as having greater social potential. Increased other-copresence should
increase self-copresence (Nowak et al., 20090. However, this pattern will not be the same for
those that do not excel at interpreting social cues. Participants that interact with a high
anthropomorphic avatar will feel less other-copresence, and thus, self-copresence will be lower.
H6b: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less self-copresence when
other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on social skills.
Mentalizing and self-copresence. Mentalizing or mental flexibility is a person's ability
to move from one task to another, and switching between the two sets of rules related to multiple
stimuli (Hill, 2004; Hill & Bird, 2006; Robinson et al., 2009; Mackinlay et al., 2006). Typicallydeveloped persons move fluidly between affective and task-related content and can devote
attention to more relevant stimuli when more than one stream of information is present.
However, based on the theory of executive dysfunction those that struggle with mentalizing, or
mental flexibility, may have difficulty controlling the flow of information from multiple sources
(Mackinlay et al., 2006; Rajendran et al., 2011; Logie et al., 2011; Woodbury-Smith & Volkmar,
2009). Moreover, individuals can become fixed on one task and find it hard to move to another
when they experience trouble with mental flexibility.
When processing an avatar and other stimuli, such as a message, there are competing
streams of information, and this can make controlling attention difficult. As a result, when
individuals with ASD that struggle with mentalizing and mental flexibility view information
from a source that has greater social potential and is more present (other copresence), this creates
a challenge for allocating resources and makes the person want to retreat and thereby reduce self
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copresence. Individuals with mentalizing and mental flexibility deficits may find an avatar that is
less present, and with less social needs more predictable (Scassellati et al., 2012). Therefore,
participants that express difficulty with mentalizing may find an instructor more connected to
them distracting, and this may reduce their desire to be involved in the interaction.
H6c: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less self-copresence when
other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on mentalizing
Self-Copresence, Other-Copresence and Perceived Instructor Satisfaction
The concept of presence is cited as an important variable in perceived learning
effectiveness and instructor satisfaction for typically developed populations (Lyons, Reysen, &
Pierce, 2012; Wei & Chen, 2012; Weinel, Bannert, Zumbach, Hoppe, & Malzahn, 2011). The
conceptualization of social presence captures the degree to which a person feels their interaction
partner can create a sense of intimacy and involvement in an interaction (Short, Williams,
&Christie, 1976). Increased presence is linked to greater media satisfaction (Nowak et al., 2009),
learning interaction satisfaction (Wei & Chen, 2012), less stress in online tasks (Weinel et al.,
2011), perceptions of better learning performance (Lyons et al., 2012; Richardson et al., 2017;
Swan & Shih, 2005), and instructor satisfaction (Richardson et al., 2017; Swan & Shih, 2005).
Thus, when individuals experience a greater sense of social presence, they also feel greater
satisfaction.
Greater satisfaction with the learning interaction and the instructor can influence
retention, student motivation, persistence, and success (Booker & Rebman, 2005; Kuo, Walker,
Belland, & Schroder, 2013; Pike, 1993; Roberts & Styron, 2010; Schreiner & Nelson, 2013).
However, the items used to operationalize the concept of social presence infer more about a

20

person's satisfaction with the medium, and less about the salience of the interaction partner
(Nowak & Biocca, 2003; Nowak et al., 2009).
The concept or sense of social presence can also be conceptualized as a dual construct
that captures partners in involvement in an interaction (other-copresence) and a participant's
sense of involvement in the interaction (self-copresence) (Nowak, 2001). Self and other
copresence are two distinct measures that capture a participant's feelings of psychological
involvement. Other-copresence indicates the degree to which a participant feels a connection to
their interaction partner, and self-copresence is about a participant's involvement in the
interaction (Nowak, 2001). Thus, based on the previous findings, increased other copresence and
self-copresence should facilitate greater instructor satisfaction (Lyons, Reysen, & Pierce, 2012;
Wei & Chen, 2012; Weinel, Bannert, Zumbach, Hoppe, & Malzahn, 2011). However,
individuals that have trouble with attention switching, social skills, and mentalizing may be
better able to learn and pay attention when they feel less self-copresence, and this may result in
increased satisfaction when their perceptions of involvement are lower. Therefore, less selfcopresence may serve as a positive predictor of teaching satisfaction for those with ASD.
H7: Self-copresence will positively predict instructor satisfaction.
H8a: Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less instructor
satisfaction when self-copresence is higher than those that score lower on attention
switching.
H8b: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less instructor satisfaction
when self-copresence is higher than those that score lower on social skills.
H8c: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less instructor satisfaction
when self-copresence is higher than those that score lower on mentalizing.
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Typically developed individuals express greater satisfaction in online learning
environments when they feel their instructor is involved (Lyons, Reysen, & Pierce, 2012; Wei &
Chen, 2012; Weinel, Bannert, Zumbach, Hoppe, & Malzahn, 2011). However, individuals that
have trouble with attention switching, social skills, and mentalizing may be better able to learn
and pay attention when they feel their instructor is less involved in their interaction. Therefore,
decreased other-copresence may result in increased satisfaction when those with mentalizing,
social skills, and attention switching difficulty feel less other-copresence. Therefore, less othercopresence may serve as a positive predictor of teaching satisfaction for those with ASD.
H9: Other-copresence will positively predict instructor effectiveness.
H10a: Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less instructor
satisfaction when other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on attention
switching.
H10b: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less instructor satisfaction
when other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on social skills.
H10c: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less instructor satisfaction
when other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on mentalizing.
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CHAPTER III: METHODS
Design and Procedure
This study adopted a quasi-experimental, posttest-only two-group design. First, all of the
subjects took the AQ (the autism spectrum quotient) and answered some basic demographic
questions. The experiment included random assignment into one of two conditions. The source
of the message in the first condition was a cartoon dolphin avatar (dolphin=1), and in the second
condition was a human (male) cartoon avatar (human=2) (See Appendix A). The human and the
dolphin avatar were dynamic, and they read a script aloud about the Environment Protection Act
(EPA) (Appendix B) to the participants. Finally, when the avatar finished the presentation,
participants completed the remaining survey questions about the variables of interest.
Study Sample
The participants for this study were all male and recruited from three sources. The
typically developed participants were recruited through a Qualtrics participant pool (n = 198).
The participants with ASD were recruited from two sources, an ASD Facebook group (n = 150)
and the Interactive Autism Network (IAN) (n = 68). All of the participants received an Amazon
gift card for their participation. Additionally, all of the ASD participants indicated they had
received a clinical diagnosis of ASD from a trained professional.
Recent research in ASD has identified a potential male bias in the diagnostic tools used to
capture this disorder (Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017; Ratto et al., 2017). Previous research
studies estimate that males are four times more likely to receive an ASD diagnosis over females
(Ratto et al., 2017). However, a recent meta-analysis indicates that males are approximately three
times more likely to qualify for a diagnosis, and these diagnostic tools are more likely to miss
females (Loomes et al., 2017) Thus, the current tools available for non-clinical application are
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not designed to address the differences in the presentation of this disorder for females. Therefore,
this research examined the differences only within the male population, as males will be more
likely to score on the AQ measures than females. The participants recruited were males between
the ages of 18-25. These criteria helped to circumvent the gender bias inherent in the AQ and
best represent college-aged students. The initial sample included 416 male participants. After
removing incomplete responses and participants that did not qualify (n=14), a sample of 402
responses were retained in the final sample. There were 199 male participants in the dolphin
cartoon condition and 204 in the human cartoon condition.
The majority of the participants identified as completing varying degrees of college
education: 36.1% (n = 146), Bachelor’s degree 19.3% (n = 78), Master’s degree 2.7% (n = 11) or
having their high school diploma 32.7% (n = 132). The remaining participants indicated that they
had completed their general education diploma (GED): 9.2% (n = 37).The ethnical composition
of the study was 51.2 % Caucasians (n = 207), 21 % African American (n = 85), 13.6 %
Hispanic (n = 55), 8.9% Asian (n = 36), 2.7 % other (n = 11), and 2.5% Native American (n =
10).
Study Stimuli
Pilot test
The pilot test included four avatars. The test included measures of perceived
anthropomorphism and realism. The pilor test ncluded 183 participants from two communication
courses at a large Northeastern University. The sample included 44 percent males (N=82) and 54
percent females (N=101). The participants first viewed still images of a human cartoon avatar
and then three animal cartoon avatars: a dolphin, a manatee, or a gorilla (See Appendix C). The
participants rated each of the avatars on perceptions of anthropomorphism and realism. The
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scales used were 7-point Likert scales (See Appendix D). The participants all saw the human
avatar first, and each of the three animal cartoons appeared in random order.
To test the differences in anthropomorphism and realism, a between-subjects ANOVA
was conducted to compare the animal avatars and the human. The analysis of variance for
anthropomorphism showed that the effect of anthropomorphism was significant at the p < .001
level for the four conditions, F(3,714) = 513.1, p = .000 (See table 1). Post hoc analyses (See
Table 2) using the Fishers LSD post hoc criterion for significance indicated that the mean
difference was significantly higher in the dolphin avatar condition (M = 3.70) than in the
manatee (M = 3.14) or the gorilla condition (M = 2.62).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Next, a one-way between-subject ANOVA compared the animal avatars on perceptions
of realism. The analysis of variance for realism showed that the effect of realism was significant
at the p < .001 level for the four conditions F(3,704) = 336.7, p = .000. Post hoc analyses (See
Table 3) using the Fishers LSD post hoc criterion for significance indicated that realism was
significantly higher in the manatee avatar condition (M = 2.54) than in the dolphin (M = .41)
condition. There were no significant differences in the gorilla condition (M = .10).
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The dolphin carton was significantly different on perceptions of anthropomorphism,
which is the primary focus of this study. Additionally, the dolphin cartoon was closest in
perceptions of realism with the human cartoon avatar. The avatars needed to vary on perceptions
of anthropomorphism, but both needed to be similar in perceptions of realism.
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Measures
The measures used in this research underwent a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to
determine the validity of the measure. The CFA included the items recommended by the
literature for each scale. The CFA also included measures for internal and external consistency.
Three criteria tested item quality (Nowak, Hamilton & Hammond, 2009). The first criterion,
which concerned the content validity of the items, was homogeneity of item content (face
validity), and Items had to tap into the same underlying theme. The coefficient alpha and the
homogeneity of the items support the internal consistency of the measure (Williams & Monge,
2001). The second criterion was internal consistency, measured with coefficient alpha
(unidimensionality), which examines whether the matrix of correlations among the items on the
scale is relatively flat. The inter-item correlation for each of the following scales, and the items,
is at .44 or higher. The third criterion was parallelism, also known as external consistency, which
examines the extent to which each item on a scale correlates with other scales in the study to
approximately the same degree (in the case of similar item quality) or forms a gradient. High
inter-item correlation and parallelism determine the external consistency of the scales used
(Williams & Monge, 2001).
The Autism Spectrum Quotient
The AQ is a self-reported measure used to determine the extent to which an individual
identifies with traits related to this disorder (Baron-Cohen, Hoekstra, Knickmeyer, &
Wheelwright, 2006). The AQ consists of 50 items measured on a seven-point metric (1 =
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) capturing five areas related to AQ: communication,
social skills, imagination, attention to detail, and attention switching and has been summed
together to form one scale in previous research (Baron-Cohen, et al 2006). Previous research
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treated the AQ as a cumulative score; however, recent research (Stevenson & Hart, 2017)
examined the use of this scale as a Likert measure and validated its use as a continuous variable
within a neurotypical population. The AQ in this study served as a means of examining
individual-level differences on the sub-dimensions of the AQ, and their relationship with
outcome variables. The CFA results confirmed four dimensions of the scale identified through
face validity, though only three dimensions (social skills, attention switching, mentalizing)
retained sufficient items to allow the creation of a useable scale. These scales do not share a
unidimensional factor structure. Therefore, the three dimensions (social skills, attention
switching, and mentalizing) were treated as separate constructs.
The factors were tested based on the three-factor solution tested and applied in previous
research (Palmer et al., 2014; Rourke & McGloin, 2019). The final scales for the AQ (See Table
3) retained twenty of the original items that comprise the separate subscales identified as Social
Skills (items: 15, 17, 22, 26, 38, 44, & 47), Attention Switching (items: 10, 25, 32, 34, & 37),
and Mentalizing (items: 3, 8, 14, 27, 31, 36, 40, & 50). The scales met the criterion to determine
parallelism. The lowest correlation within factors for social skills (r = .43) attention switching
(r = .45) and mentalizing (r = .47) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also
showed good internal consistency in this study: (social skills: α = .83; attention switching: α =
.73; mentalizing: α = .78).
The participants who reported having a diagnosis of ASD were significantly different on
the AQ scales from those who did not have ASD (See Table 5). An analysis of variance indicates
that participants without ASD scored significantly higher on social skills attention switching
(M = 3.87, SD\ and mentalizing
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
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Anthropomorphism
Anthropomorphism included five items (See Table 4), measured using seven points from
not at all to very much (Nowak et al., 2009). The final scales for the human cartoon avatar and
the dolphin cartoon avatar retained all five items. The scales met the criterion to determine
parallelism. The lowest correlation within factors for dolphin cartoon anthropomorphism (r =
.67) and the human cartoon anthropomorphism (r = .60) met the criterion for external
consistency. The scales also showed good internal consistency in this study: (dolphin
cartoon: α = .88; human cartoon: α = .87).
Homophily
McCroskey, Richmond, and Daly’s (1975) measure (See Table 4) captures a participant’s
perception of perceived homophily. The operational definition of the construct includes measures
of attitude and background as well as status (McCroskey et al., 1975). The scale includes seven
items, measured using seven points from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The scale includes
items such as ¨This person/avatar thinks like me¨, and ¨This person/avatar is like me¨.
The final scale retained five items. The scale met the criterion to determine parallelism.
However, two items had low internal consistency, and they were not included. The items
removed were 1. My instructor thinks like me, 6. My instructor’s status is like mine. The scales
met the criterion to determine parallelism. The lowest correlation within factors for the
remaining dolphin cartoon homophily items (r = .44) and the human cartoon homophily items
(r = .60) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also showed good internal
consistency in this study: (dolphin cartoon: α = .67; human cartoon: α = .80).
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Copresence
Nowak & Biocca’s (2003) measure captured the participant’s perceptions of copresence
using two scales (See Table 4), of perceived other-copresence, and self-reported copresence.
Perceived other-copresence. The scale includes eleven items, measured using seven
points from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The scales include items such as, “My
interaction partner was intensely involved in our interaction,” “My interaction partner seemed to
find our interaction stimulating,” and “My interaction partner communicated coldness rather than
warmth.” Based on the inter-item correlations, the final scales for the human cartoon avatar and
the dolphin cartoon avatar retained six of the original items. The items removed were, 3. My
instructor communicated coldness rather than warmth. 4. My instructor created a sense of
distance between us. 5. My instructor seemed detached during our interaction. 6. My instructor
was unwilling to share personal information with me. 9. My instructor acted bored by our
conversation. The scales met the criterion to determine parallelism. The lowest correlation within
factors for the remaining dolphin cartoon other-copresence scale (r = .59) and human cartoon
other-copresence scale (r = .67) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also
showed good internal consistency in this study: (dolphin cartoon: α = .87; human cartoon: α =
.87).
Self-reported copresence. The scale includes five items, measured using seven points
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The scales include items such as, “The avatar was
intensely involved in our interaction” and “The avatar created a sense of closeness between us.”
The final scales for the human cartoon avatar and the dolphin cartoon avatar retained all five
items. The scales met the criterion to determine parallelism. The lowest correlation within factors
for dolphin cartoon self-reported copresence (r = .53) and the human cartoon self-reported
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copresence (r = .75) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also showed good
internal consistency in this study: (dolphin cartoon: α = .84; human cartoon: α = .91).
Perceived instructor satisfaction
The measure is a modified scale (See Table 4) from Nowak, Watt, & Walther (2009). The
scale includes eight items, measured using seven points from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
The scales include items such as, “To what extent did you feel you got a good enough idea of
how your instructor was reacting?”, “Do you think you got a ‘‘feel” for your instructor at the
other end?” The final scales for the human cartoon avatar and the dolphin cartoon avatar retained
all eight items. The scales met the criterion to determine parallelism. The lowest correlation
within factors for dolphin anthropomorphism (r = .57) and for the human anthropomorphism (r =
.47) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also showed good internal consistency
in this study: (dolphin cartoon: α = .87; human cartoon: α = .89).
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 presents all of the factor loadings, means, and standard deviations for the scales
used. ,
Manipulation Check
First, a factorial ANOVA compared perceptions of anthropomorphism in the human
avatar condition to those in the dolphin avatar condition, ASD diagnosis, and no diagnosis, and
the interaction effect. Table 8a shows that there is a significant effect for ASD diagnosis F(1,
391) = 58.46, p = .000, on perceptions of anthropomorphism. Condition is also a significant
predictor F1, 391) = 28.00, p = .000, of anthropomorphism (see Table 8b). However, there is no
significant interaction between condition and ASD diagnosis on perceptions of
anthropomorphism. This study is largely concerned with perceptions of anthropomorphism and
not the effect of condition.
Additionally, while having a diagnosis of autism may affect these perceptions, most of
the hypotheses in this study look at the sub-dimension of the AQ. However, it is essential to look
at the diagnosis in totality first and then examine the unique contribution of each sub-scale.
Previous research indicates that the subscales do not always correlate with one another and
therefore are not a unidimensional construct (Palmer et al., 2014; Rourke & McGloin, 2019).
Furthermore, each scale provides a unique explanatory power that would be lost by examining a
binary measure of diagnosis.
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Hypothesis Testing
The hypotheses in this study were all tested using hierarchal regression analysis. The
categorical variables in the study were effect coded. The avatars were coded (human=2, and
dolphin=1) (see Table 7), and the participants were coded based on diagnosis (ASD=-1, no
ASD=1) (see Table 8). Hierarchical regression is the best method to see the effect of the
individual AQ measures and perceived anthropomorphism, beyond the effects of condition and
diagnosis. The condition and diagnosis are multiplied together to create an interaction term. The
second step of the regression model included the interaction term to examine the effect of the
interaction on perceptions of anthropomorphism and the (see Table 9). All of the regression
analyses included two steps. The first step included the direct effect of ASD diagnosis and the
direct effect on the independent variables proposed by each hypothesis. The second step included
the proposed interaction term for the hypothesis. The interactions for each hypothesis were
computed by first centering the variables using the appropriate z-score, and then the z-scores
were multiplied to compute the interaction.
Based on the social motivation theory of autism, research question one proposed that an
individual’s social skills might influence how anthropomorphic they perceive the avatars. This
model was significant, but in the opposite direction than the theory predicts. The condition did
have a significant effect on perceptions of anthropomorphism F(1, 393) =22.87, p < .001, and the
human cartoon avatar significantly and positively predicted perceptions of anthropomorphism
(β = .24, p < .001). Additionally, a participants social skills also significantly affected
perceptions of anthropomorphism F(2, 392) = 21.89, p < .001. Social skills positively predicted
(β = .21, p < .001) an additional 5 percent of the variance explained (R2 = .10, ∆R2 = .05) in
perceptions of anthropomorphism.
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Based on the social motivation theory of autism research, question two proposed that an
individual’s mentalizing abilities might also influence how anthropomorphic they perceive the
avatars. However, this model was not significant. Condition was significant F(1, 391)
=22.33, p < .001; and it was found that the human cartoon avatar positively predicted perceptions
of anthropomorphism (β = .23, p < .001). However, mentalizing did not affect perceptions of
anthropomorphism.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that typically developed individuals would experience more
homophily when they perceive anthropomorphism to be higher. Therefore, there will be a direct
effect of anthropomorphism on homophily and the interaction between ASD diagnosis and
anthropomorphism. The first model contained the direct effect for anthropomorphism and ASD
diagnosis on homophily, and the model was significant F(2, 387) = 5.28, p < .01, and predicted 3
percent (R2 = .03) of the variance explained in perceptions of homophily. Anthropomorphism
was the only significant predictor (β = .17, p = .001 of homophily). The second model included
the interaction effect of ASD diagnosis and perceived anthropomorphism on homophily
proposed by hypothesis 1. This model was also significant F(3, 386) = 7.34, p =.000 and the
interaction predicts an additional 2 percent (R2 = .05, ∆R2 = .02) of the variance in perceptions
of homophily. The significant predictors are anthropomorphism (β = .16, p < .01), and the
interaction between ASD diagnosis and anthropomorphism (β = .17, p = .001) homophily. The
regression model provides support for hypothesis 1. Thus, a follow-up test will clarify the
moderation effect of ASD.
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism and perceptions
of homophily as moderated by ASD – categorized as low (-1 no ASD) and high (+1 ASD). As
demonstrated in Figure 1, the simple slope was statistically significant at a high level (β =
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.05, p = .000). Therefore, those with ASD expressed more homophily with the more
anthropomorphic avatar than those without ASD.
Hypothesis 2a predicted that social skills would moderate the relationship between
anthropomorphism and homophily. Therefore, there should be a direct effect of
anthropomorphism on homophily and the interaction between social skills and
anthropomorphism. The first model contained the direct effect for ASD diagnosis and
anthropomorphism on homophily, and the model was significant F(3, 386) = 3.85, p = .01. The
model predicted 3 percent (R2 = .03) of the variance explained in perceptions of homophily. The
significant predictor of homophily was anthropomorphism (β = .17, p < .01). The second model
included the interaction between social skills and anthropomorphism, the model was
significant F(4, 385) = 5.11, p = .001; the interaction predicted an additional 2 percent (R2 =
.05, ∆R2 = .02) of the variance in perceptions of homophily. The significant predictors are,
anthropomorphism (β = .17, p < .01) and the interaction between social skills and
anthropomorphism (β = .15, p < .01).
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism on perceptions
of homophily as moderated by social skills – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean),
medium (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 2, the simple
slope was statistically significant at the medium (β = .09, p = .00) and high level (β = .22, p =
.000). Therefore, those with ASD expressed more homophily with the more anthropomorphic
avatar than those without ASD. This effect is in the opposite direction.
Hypothesis 2b predicted an interaction effect for mentalizing and anthropomorphism on
homophily. Thus, those that struggle more with mentalizing will feel less homophily with the
more anthropomorphic avatar than they will with the less anthropomorphic avatar. The first
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model included anthropomorphism, mentalizing, and ASD diagnosis. The model was
significant F(3, 384) = 6.24, p < .001 and predicted 5 percent (R2 = .05) of the variance
explained in perceptions of homophily. The significant predictors are anthropomorphism (β =
.13, p < .05) and mentalizing (β = -.17, p < .01). The second model included the interaction
between mentalizing and anthropomorphism, and the model was significant F(4, 383) = 6.92, p <
.01. The interaction between mentalizing and anthropomorphism predicted an additional 2
percent (R2 = .07, ∆R2 = .02) of the variance in perceptions of homophily. The significant
predictors are anthropomorphism (β = .154, p <.01 .05), mentalizing (β = -.14, p < .05) and the
interaction (β = .15, p < .01).The regression model provides support for hypothesis 2b.
A follow-up test will clarify (see Figure 3) the moderation effect of mentalizing at
different levels – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean), medium (mean), and high
(+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 2, the simple slope was statistically
significant at medium (β = .11, p =.001) and high levels (β = .22, p < .01). The figure and results
indicate those that struggle more with mentalizing experienced more homophily with the more
anthropomorphic avatar than the less anthropomorphic avatar. The results are significant but in
the opposite direction predicted.
Hypothesis 3 hypothesized that typically developed individuals would experience more
other-copresence when they perceive anthropomorphism to be higher. Thus, there will be a direct
effect of anthropomorphism on other-copresence and the interaction between diagnosis and
anthropomorphism. The first model included the direct effect for homophily, ASD diagnosis, and
anthropomorphism on perceptions of other-copresence. The first model was significant F(3, 384)
= 6.34, p = .000; and predicted 5 percent of the variance (R2 = .05) in perceptions of other
copresence. The significant predictors in the first model are anthropomorphism (β = .18, p =
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.001) and homophily (β = .11, p < .05). The second model included the interaction for ASD
diagnosis and anthropomorphism; the model was significant F(4, 383) = 14.04, p = .000, and
predicted an additional 5 percent of the variance in perceptions of other copresence (R2 =
.10, ∆R2 = .05). The significant predictors in the second model are anthropomorphism (β =
.18, p = .001), and the interaction (β =.24, p = .000).
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism and perceptions
of other-copresence as moderated by ASD – categorized as low (-1 no ASD), and high (+1
ASD). The results (see Figure 4) indicate that those with autism experience greater othercopresence with the more anthropomorphic avatar than those with a diagnosis. The effect is
significant, but the effect is in the opposite direction.
Hypothesis 4a predicted that there would be an interaction between attention switching
and anthropomorphism. Thus, those that struggle more with attention switching will experience
less other-copresence with the more anthropomorphic avatar. The first model included ASD
diagnosis, homophily, anthropomorphism and attention switching. The model was
significant F(4, 383) = 9.12, p = .000, and predicted 9 percent (R2 = .09) of the variance in
perceptions of other copresence. The significant predictors in the second model are
anthropomorphism (β = .16, p < .01) and attention switching (β = -.22, p =.000). The second
model included the interaction effect and the model was significant F(5, 382) = 8.22, p < .05.
The interaction accounts for an additional 1 percent (R2 = .10, ∆R2 = .01) of the variance
explained in perceptions other-copresence. The significant predictors are anthropomorphism (β =
.15, p < .01), homophily (β = .10, p < .05), attention switching (β = -.23, p =.000), and the
interaction (β = -.10, p < .05).
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A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism and othercopresence as moderated by mentalizing – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean), medium
(mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 5, the simple slope was
statistically significant at low (β = .19, p = .000) and medium levels (β = .12, p < .01). The figure
indicates that those that struggle more with mentalizing will experience less other-copresence
when anthropomorphism is high.
Hypothesis 4b predicted that social skills would moderate the effect of
anthropomorphism on other-copresence. The first model included ASD diagnosis, homophily,
anthropomorphism, and social skills. The model was significant F(4, 383) = 7.16, p = .000; and
predicted 6 percent (R2 = .06) of the variance in perceptions of other-copresence.
Anthropomorphism (β = .19, p = .000), homophily (β = .11, p <.05), and social skills (β = .17, p < .01) were significant positive predictors of other-copresence. The interaction effect of
social skills and anthropomorphism proposed by 4b was not significant.
Hypothesis 4c predicted that mentalizing would moderate the relationship between
anthropomorphism and other-copresence, such that those that are lower in mentalizing will
experience less other-copresence than those higher in mentalizing. The first model contained
ASD diagnosis, anthropomorphism, homophily and mentalizing and the model was
significant F(4, 381) = 7.30, p =.000. The model predicts 6 percent (R2 = .06) of the variance
explained in perceptions of other-copresence. Anthropomorphism (β = .15, p = .01) and
mentalizing (β = -.19, p < .01) are significant predictors of other-reported copresence. The
second model included the interaction effect for mentalizing and anthropomorphism on othercopresence; the model is significant F(5, 380) = 7.15, p =.000 and predicts an additional 1
percent (R2 = .07, ∆R2 = .01) of the variance explained in perceptions of other-copresence. The
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significant predictors in the final model are anthropomorphism (β = .13, p < .05), mentalizing
(β = -.22, p =.000), and the interaction (β = -.13, p =.05).
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism and othercopresence as moderated by mentalizing – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean), medium
(mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 6, the simple slope was
statistically significant at low (β = .22, p = .000) and medium levels (β = .14, p = .000). The
figure indicates that those that struggle more with mentalizing will experience less othercopresence when anthropomorphism is high.
Hypothesis 5 tests the direct effect for other-copresence, on self-copresence. The first
model included the direct effect for other-copresence, homophily, ASD diagnosis and
anthropomorphism on perceptions of self-copresence; model is significant F(4, 381) = 25.24, p =
.000 and accounts for 21 percent (R2 = .16) of the variance explained in perceptions of selfcopresence. The model included significant direct effects for ASD diagnosis (β = .10, p <.05)
anthropomorphism (β = .40, p = .000) and other-copresence (β = -.20, p = .000). The final model
included the interaction and the model was not significant.
Hypothesis 6a tested the interaction between attention switching and other-copresence on
self-copresence. Hypothesis 6a predicts that those who struggle more with attention switching
will experience less self-copresence when other-copresence is high. The first model included the
main effect for ASD diagnosis homophily, attention switching, anthropomorphism, and othercopresence. The model was significant F(5, 380) = 28.16, p = .000 and accounts for 21 percent
(R2 = .21) of the variance explained in perceptions of self-copresence. The significant predictors
in the model are ASD diagnosis (β = .12, p <.05), anthropomorphism (β = .40, p = .000) and
other-copresence (β = -.20, p =.000). The second block included the interaction effect with
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attention switching and other-copresence. The model was significant F(6, 379) = 26.448, p =
.000, and predicts an additional 3 percent (R2 = .24, ∆R2 = .03) of the variance explained in selfcopresence. The significant predictors in the second model are anthropomorphism (β = .40, p =
.000), other-copresence (β = -.22, p = .000), and the interaction was a significant predictor (β = .17, p = .000). The regression model provides support for hypothesis 6a. Thus, a follow up test
will clarify the moderation effect of attention switching at different levels.
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between other-copresence on perceptions of
self copresence as moderated by attention switching – categorized as low (-1 SD below the
mean), medium (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 6, the
simple slope was statistically significant at medium (β = -.12, p < .05) and high levels (β = .33, p = .000). The figure and results indicate those that struggle more with attention switching
skills experienced less self copresence when other-copresence was high than those that struggle
less with attention switching.
Hypothesis 6b tested the interaction between social skills and other-copresence on
perceptions of self-copresence. Hypothesis 6b predicts that those who score higher on social
skills will experience less self-copresence when other-copresence is high. The first model was
significant F(5, 380) = 39.13, p = .000 and predicts 21 percent (R2 = .21) of the variance
explained in perceptions of self-copresence. The significant predictors are anthropomorphism
(β = .40, p = .000) and other-copresence (β = -.19, p= .000). The second model included the
interaction, and there were no significant interaction effects for social skills and other-copresence
on self-copresence.
Hypothesis 6c tested the interaction between metalizing and other-copresence on
perceptions of self-copresence. Hypothesis 6c predicts that those who score higher on
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mentalizing will experience less self-copresence when other-copresence is high. The first model
included the direct effects for anthropomorphism, homophily, ASD diagnosis, other-copresence,
and mentalizing. The model was significant F(5, 378) = 20.71, p = .000 and accounts for 21
percent (R2 = .21) of the variance explained in perceptions of self-copresence. The significant
predictors are ASD diagnosis (β = -.35, p < .05), anthropomorphism (β = .41, p = .000), and
other-copresence (β = -.20, p = -000). The second model included the interaction effect between
mentalizing and other-copresence and was not significant.
Hypothesis 7 tested the direct effect of ASD diagnosis, self-copresence, and the
interaction on instructor satisfaction. The first [block included the main effects of ASD
diagnosis, anthropomorphism, homophily, and self-copresence. The model was significant F(4,
378) = 14.79, p = .000 and predicts 14 percent (R2 =.14) of the variance in perceptions of
instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors of instructor satisfaction are homophily (β =
.15, p <.01) and self-copresence (β = -.36, p = .000). The interaction in the second model was not
significant.
Hypothesis 8a tested the interaction between attention switching and perceptions of selfcopresence on instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effect for ASD
diagnosis, anthropomorphism, homophily, attention switching and self-copresence; the model
was significant F(5, 377) =19.89, p = .000 and predicts 15 percent (R2 = .15) of the variance in
perceptions of instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors of instructor satisfaction are,
homophily (β = .13, p < .01), attention switching (β = -.16, p <.01), and self-copresence (β = .36, p = .000). The second model included the interaction between attention switching and selfcopresence on instructor satisfaction; the model was significant F(6, 376) = 19.61, p = .000 and
predicts an additional 3 percent (R2 = .17, ∆R2 = .03) of the variance explained in instructor
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satisfaction. The predictors are; homophily (β = .14, p < .01), self-copresence (β = -.37, p =
.000), attention switching (β = -.16, p < .01), and the interaction between attention switching and
self-copresence (β = -.17, p =.000). The regression model provides support for hypothesis 8a.
Thus, a follow up test will clarify the moderation effect of mentalizing at different levels.
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between self-copresence on perceptions of
instructor satisfaction as moderated by attention switching – categorized as low (-1 SD below the
mean), medium (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 8, the
simple slope was statistically significant at the low (β = -.16, p = .00), medium (β = -.30, p =
.000), and high levels (β = -.46, p = .000). The figure and results indicate those that struggle
more with attention experienced greater instructor satisfaction when self copresence was low
than those that struggle less with attention switching.
Hypothesis 8b tested the interaction between social skills on perceptions of selfcopresence on instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD
diagnosis, anthropomorphism, homophily, social skills and self-copresence on instructor
satisfaction; the model was significant F(5, 377) = 16.15, p = .000 and predicted 18 percent (R2
= .18) of the variance in perceptions of instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors in the
model were homophily (β = .16, p = .001), social skills (β = -.23, p = .000), self-copresence (β =
-.34, p = .000). The second model included the interaction between social skills and selfcopresence and was not significant.
Hypothesis 8c tested the interaction between mentalizing and self-copresence on
instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis,
anthropomorphism, mentalizing and self-copresence on instructor satisfaction; the model was
significant F(5, 375) = 11.82, p = .000 and predicts 13 percent (R2 = .13) of the variance. The
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significant predictors are homophily (β = .13, p = .01), mentalizing (β = -.11, p < .05), and selfcopresence (β = -.35, p = .000). The second model included the interaction between mentalizing
and self-copresence and the model was significant F(6, 374) = 11.61, p < .01 and predicts an
additional 2percent (R2 = .16, ∆R2 = .02). The significant predictors are homophily (β = .14, p =
.01), mentalizing (β = -.12, p < .05), self-copresence (β = -.37, p = .000), and the interaction (β =
-.15, p < .01). The regression model provides support for hypothesis 8c. Thus, a follow up test
will clarify the moderation effect of mentalizing at different levels.
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between self copresence on perceptions of
instructor satisfaction as moderated by mentalizing – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean),
medium (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 9, the simple
slope was statistically significant at the low (β = -.19, p = .000), medium (β = -.31, p = .000), and
high levels (β = -.43, p = .000). The figure and results indicate that those who struggle more with
mentalizing experienced greater instructor satisfaction when self-copresence was low than those
that struggle less with mentalizing.
Hypothesis 9 tested the main effect of ASD diagnosis, other-copresence and the
interaction on instructor satisfaction. The model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis,
anthropomorphism, homophily, self-copresence, and other-copresence; the model was
significant F(5, 375) = 49.15, p = .000 and predicts 39 percent (R2 = .39) of the variance in
instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors are homophily (β = .10, p < .05), selfcopresence (β = -.24, p = .000) and other-copresence (β = .53, p = .000). The second model
included the interaction and the model was not significant.
Hypothesis 10a tested the interaction between attention switching and other-copresence
on instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis,
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homophily, anthropomorphism, self-copresence, other-copresence, and attention switching; the
model is significant F(6, 374) = 41.13, p = .000 and predicts an additional 39 percent (R2 = .39)
of the variance perceptions of instructor satisfaction. Self-copresence (β = -.24, p = .000) and
other-copresence (β = .52, p = .000) are the significant predictors of instructor satisfaction. The
final model included the interaction between mentalizing and other-copresence, and the model
was not significant.
Hypothesis 10b tested the interaction between social skills and other-copresence on
instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis, homophily,
anthropomorphism, self-copresence, other-copresence and attention switching; the model was
significant F(6, 374) = 43.60, p = .000] and predicts 12 percent (R2 = .40) of the variance in
perceptions of instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors were homophily (β = -.10, p =
.01), self-copresence (β = -.23, p = .000), other-copresence (β = .51, p = .000) and social skills
(β = -.14, p <.01). The second model included the interaction between attention switching and
other-copresence, and the model was not significant.
Hypothesis 10c tested the interaction between mentalizing and other-copresence on
instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis, homophily,
anthropomorphism, self-copresence, mentalizing, and other-copresence. The first model was
significant F(6, 372) = 39.40, p = .000 and predicts 38 percent (R2 = .38) of the variance in
instructor satisfaction. Homophily (β = .09, p < .05), self-copresence (β = -.23, p = .000), and
other-copresence (β = .53, p = .000) are the significant predictors of instructor satisfaction. The
final model included the interaction between mentalizing and other-copresence, and the model
was not significant.
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Summary of Hypotheses
RQ1:
No
Social skills will moderate perceptions of anthropomorphism.
RQ2:
Yes
Mentalizing will moderate perceptions of anthropomorphism
H1:
Yes
Anthropomorphism will positively predict perceptions of homophily. ASD diagnosis
will moderate the effect of anthropomorphism on homophily, such that those with an
ASD diagnosis will perceive less homophily than those without a diagnosis.
H2a:
No
Participants that score higher on social skills will report less homophily when
perceived anthropomorphism is higher than those that score lower on social skills.
H2b:
Yes
Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less homophily when
perceived anthropomorphism is higher, than those that score lower on mentalizing.
H3:
Yes
Anthropomorphism will positively predict other-copresence. ASD diagnosis will
moderate this effect, such that those with an ASD diagnosis will perceive less othercopresence when anthropomorphism is high than those without a diagnosis.
H4a:
Yes
Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less other-copresence
when perceived anthropomorphism is higher, than those that that score lower on
attention switching.
H4b:
Yes
Participants that score higher on social skills will report less other-copresence when
perceived anthropomorphism higher, than those that score lower on social skills.
H4c:
Yes
Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less other-copresence when
anthropomorphism is high than those that score lower on mentalizing.
H5:
Yes
Other-copresence will positively predict self-copresence. ASD diagnosis will
moderate the effect of other-copresence on self-copresence, such that those with an
ASD diagnosis will perceive less self-copresence when other-copresence is high than
those without a diagnosis.
H6a:
Yes
Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less self-copresence
when other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on attention switching.
H6b:
No
Participants that score higher on social skills will report less self-copresence when
other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on social skills.
H6c:
No
Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less self-copresence when
other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on mentalizing.
H7:
Yes
Self-copresence will positively predict instructor satisfaction. ASD diagnosis will
moderate the effect of self-copresence on instructor satisfaction, such that those with
an ASD diagnosis will perceive less instructor satisfaction when self-copresence is
high than those without a diagnosis.
H8a:
Yes
Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less instructor
satisfaction when self-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on attention
switching.
H8b:
No
Participants that score higher on social skills will report less instructor satisfaction
when self-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on social skills.
H8c:
No
Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less instructor satisfaction
when self-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on mentalizing.
H9:
No
Other-copresence will positively predict instructor effectiveness. ASD diagnosis will
moderate the effect of other-copresence on instructor satisfaction, such that those with
an ASD diagnosis will perceive less instructor satisfaction when other-copresence is
high than those without a diagnosis.
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H10a:

No

H10b:

No

H10c:

No

Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less instructor
satisfaction when other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on attention
switching.
Participants that score higher on social skills will report less instructor satisfaction
when other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on social skills.
Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less instructor satisfaction
when other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on mentalizing.
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION
Summary of Findings
This study is one of the first to examine the effect of perceptions and self and othercopresence with ASD participants. Based on the theory of executive dysfunction, when a person
struggles with mentalizing, social skills, and attention switching, they will process information
differently than their typically developed peers. The existing literature in education emphasizes
the importance of presence as a significant predictor of learning satisfaction online. The results
from this study indicate that presence is an important construct, but self-copresence and othercopresence are discreet constructs and should be separate measures. Furthermore, the individual
measures of the AQ confirm that individual characteristics also play an essential role in the
perception process.
Information processing theory and the theory of executive dysfunction taken together
support the assumptions proposed by this study. Individuals have a limited capacity to process
information, and for those that experience specific issues related to executive function, they
process information differently than their typically developed peers. The literature on the impact
of presence is education emphasizes the importance of presence in distance learning. The studies
in this specific area emphasize the importance of presence as a significant predictor of student
satisfaction and motivation (Booker & Rebman, 2005; Kuo, Walker, Belland, & Schroder, 2013;
Pike, 1993; Roberts & Styron, 2010; Schreiner & Nelson, 2013), as well as instructor satisfaction
(Lyons, Reysen, & Pierce, 2012; Wei & Chen, 2012; Weinel, Bannert, Zumbach, Hoppe, &
Malzahn, 2011). However, as the results from this study indicate that presence is not a singular
construct, and all participants to not respond to increased presence in the same way. Participants
in the study that scored higher on the measures of the AQ specifically related to attention
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switching and mentalizing experience digital environments differently than their typically
developed peers. The results from this study also show that these unique individual differences
can lead to less satisfaction with the instructor when the user experiences increased presence in
the interaction. Additionally, the results from this study show that those on the spectrum process
anthropomorphism and perceptions of copresence differently than their TD peers.
The first question posed by this study specifically examined perceptions of humanness or
anthropomorphism for those with ASD. The research examining how those with ASD respond to
less humanlike characters has not explicitly examined anthropomorphism as a variable. The
results from this study first show that those with ASD do not perceive anthropomorphism or selfcopresence in the same way that their typically developed peers do. The social motivation theory
of autism explains that those with ASD may not prefer engaging with persons or, in the case of
this study, digital entities that they perceive to have greater social potential. Individuals with
ASD may find greater social potential less rewarding because they do not seek social rewards,
and they find those interactions less rewarding. The social entities may be less rewarding
because of problems with specific social skills, but also to deficits related to executive functions.
The results from this study show that when participants with ASD interacted with an avatar that
they rated as more anthropomorphic, they experienced increased homophily with the avatar. The
results also indicate that individual differences in social skills and mentalizing predicted a
stronger feeling of homophily with the more anthropomorphic avatar.
The findings are not in the predicted direction, but they make sense theoretically. The
human avatar is perceived, as "more human" than the dolphin, but the human avatar is, in fact,
still a digital representation of a human. The CASA paradigm has established that individuals
will apply social rules when interacting with computers (Reeves & Nass, 1996). The more that
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computers or digital entities exhibit greater social potential, the more likely they are to be rated
as anthropomorphic. Previous research examining avatars with typically developed participants
found a positive correlation between perceptions of anthropomorphism and homophily. The
results from this study support those findings for those that scored higher on the AQ scales
related to social skills and mentalizing.
Based on the theory of executive dysfunction, those with ASD tend to struggle with selfperception, planning, and judgment. Therefore, these specific executive dysfunctions might
affect perceptions of homophily or similarity with an avatar perceived as having greater social
potential. The results from the moderation analysis indicate that when individuals struggled more
with social skills and mentalizing, they experienced more homophily with the more
anthropomorphic avatar. Previous research indicates that those with ASD prefer robots and less
humanlike characters, but these studies did not measure a participant's perceptions of
anthropomorphism. The findings from this study indicate that homophily was higher with the
more humanlike avatars, even for participants that are on the autism spectrum. The results
signify that while individuals with ASD may prefer robots and less humanlike characters, they
feel similar to humanlike representations. The human avatar is, in fact, more similar to the
participants in the study than a dolphin, and thus, the effect for anthropomorphism is unaffected
by a participant's social skills or mentalizing ability. The avatars used in this study were
dynamic, but they cannot display emotion or to show a wide range of facial expressions. This
may account for the lack of variance in homophily for those with ASD. A more "humanlike"
avatar that can emote more may produce different results.
This study also supports the assertion that those with ASD may not benefit from
increased social potential, specifically increased perceptions of self-copresence. The more
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anthropomorphic avatar in this study did increase perceptions of self-copresence as predicted.
Additionally, there is a positive direct effect for other-copresence on self-copresence. However,
those that expressed trouble with attention switching and mentalizing did not feel more selfcopresence when other-copresence was high. Finally, the results show that when othercopresence is high, participants felt less self-copresence, and lower self-copresence serves as a
positive predictor of instructor satisfaction. The results indicate that those that expressed more
difficulty with mentalizing and attention switching prefer to feel less self-copresence in the
online environment.
Anthropomorphism positively correlates with greater perceptions of self and other
copresence. Furthermore, when other-copresence is higher, participants also feel more selfcopresence. However, based on the theory of executive dysfunction, those that struggle more
with attention switching, social skills, and mentalizing will experience less self-copresence when
other-copresence is higher. The theory of executive dysfunction identifies that when individuals
have trouble with mental flexibility, they are not able to move fluidly from one task to another.
As a result, participants must attend to the avatar in tandem with the content of the message.
Therefore, they must attempt to understand the other and the message simultaneously.
Participants in this study listened to a message about the environmental protection act.
However, the avatar in this study represents the second stream of content that participants must
process. The avatar also represents a stream of information that contains a varying degree of
social potential. A participant's ability to mentalize, or understand others can make it difficult to
focus on the message and affect their ability to feel present in the learning environment. There
were no significant moderation effects for social skills; however, attention switching and
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mentalizing produced significant moderation effects between other-copresence and perceptions
of self-copresence.
Typically, when other-copresence is high, participants also feel they are more copresent
(self-copresent). However, based on the theory of executive dysfunction, individuals with ASD
may process information differently than their typically developed peers. The results from this
study provide support for the assertions that increased other-copresence did not increase selfcopresence for those with ASD. The hierarchal regression analysis conducted included the main
effect of anthropomorphism on perceptions of self-copresence. The literature indicates that when
anthropomorphism is high, self-copresence will increase. However, the results from this study
show that when a person struggles more with their ability to take the perspectives of others
(mentalize), increased other-copresence negatively affects self-copresence. Thus, when
participants expressed more difficulty mentalizing, they experienced less self-copresence when
other-copresence was high. Figure 7 illustrates that when participants struggle more with
mentalizing and they are with an avatar, they have rated higher in other-copresence; they feel
less self-copresence—these effects held at both low med and high levels of mentalizing.
Therefore, increased other-copresence and anthropomorphism can be beneficial on their
own to increase a student's sense of being present. However, an individual's ability to imagine
the perspectives of others will significantly affect their sense of self-copresence. The results
indicate that a participant's perception of anthropomorphism positively affects their selfcopresence. However, when participants struggle more with mentalizing increased othercopresence will negatively affect self-copresence. The negative effect of self-copresence did not
negatively predict instructor satisfaction. The participants that struggle with mentalizing
expressed greater instructor satisfaction when they felt less presence in the interaction and, this

50

follows with the theory of executive dysfunction and the difficulties that those with ASD
experience when processing multiple streams of information. Thus, when self-copresence in
lower and the participants do not feel that they need to process themselves in the interaction, they
likely feel they can concentrate more on the instructor and the content.
The participants that expressed difficulty with attention switching also felt less selfcopresence when other-copresence was high. The competing streams of information that are
present when presented with a dynamic avatar and a message pose a potential problem for those
that struggle with staying on task and regulating the flow of information. Therefore, when othercopresence is high, participants are processing entities that also have more potential that is social.
The more anthropomorphic avatar is higher in social potential and, in turn, increased perceptions
of other-copresence. However, this is not true for those that struggle with attention switching.
Figure four shows that those both high and low on attention switching will perceive less selfcopresence when other-copresence is high. Thus, the more anthropomorphic avatar is less critical
for those with ASD.
Participants that express difficulty with mentalizing and attention switching may find a
source that is higher in copresence to be distracting, and this affects their ability to feel more
self-copresence. The current literature in education emphasizes the importance of greater
instructor presence. However, the results of this study indicate that this may not be important for
all types of students. Information processing theories posit that individuals have a limited
capacity to process stimuli, and allocating resources properly aids in processing information.
These findings show that those with ASD are less involved when an instructor is more salient.
Thus, processing an avatar perceived as more copresent, and the content aimed at understanding,
can be more challenging for persons with ASD. Participants did express greater instructor
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effectiveness when self-copresence was high. However, as postulated, this was not the case for
those with ASD. The participants that struggle more with mentalizing and attention switching
expressed greater instructor effectiveness when self-copresence was low.
Information processing theory states that all individuals have a limited capacity to attend
to information. Taken together with the theory of executive dysfunction, individuals that struggle
with attention switching, or moving fluidly from one task to another, will experience greater
difficulty than their more typically developed peers will. The results from Figure 5 support these
theoretical models and the proposed hypothesis. The participants that expressed more trouble
with attention switching in the low, medium, and high conditions expressed lower instructor
satisfaction when self-copresence was high.
Based on the study findings, all that can be determined is that those participants that
express social skills deficits rate the instructor regardless of condition or perceptions of
anthropomorphism, as less satisfactory. One of the core areas that define autistic disorders is a
deficit in social skills. Therefore, future research will need to disentangle which type of virtual
instructor would work best for those that struggle with social skills. The conclusion delves into a
more in-depth discussion of this finding.
Avatars that are more anthropomorphic are important to instructor satisfaction. However,
for those that experience problems with mentalizing their self-copresence and mentalizing
abilities can affect instructor satisfaction beyond perceptions of anthropomorphism. Figure 6
shows that when individuals struggle more with mentalizing, they report lower instructor
satisfaction when their self-copresence is high. Based on the theory of executive dysfunction
those that struggle with mentalizing, or mental flexibility, typically experience difficulty
controlling the flow of information from multiple sources (Mackinlay et al., 2006; Rajendran et
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al., 2011; Logie et al., 2011; Woodbury-Smith & Volkmar, 2009). Participants fixed on one a
task, perhaps perceiving themselves, will have trouble moving to another. Processing another
entity in an online setting can prove to be more difficult for those with mentalizing deficits.
Therefore, increasing self-copresence for those with mentalizing deficits decreases instructor
satisfaction.
Theoretical Implications
The concept of presence, despite the many varied conceptualizations, has been cited as an
essential variable in perceived learning effectiveness (Lyons, et al.,2012; Wei & Chen, 2012;
Weinel et al., 2011), learning interaction satisfaction (Wei & Chen, 2012), less stress when
completing online tasks (Weinel et al., 2011) and perceptions of better learning performance
(Lyons et al., 2012). However, as this study indicates a person's ability to mentalize and switch
attention effectively moderates this effect. This study shows that when participants struggle in
these areas and self-copresence is low, instructor effectiveness is higher. Therefore, less selfcopresence serves as a positive predictor of instructor satisfaction for those with difficulties
associated with ASD.
Social skills did have a significant main effect on perceptions of instructor satisfaction.
Participants in the study that scored higher on the social skills scale reported lower levels of
instructor satisfaction. The participants that score higher on social skills are those that express
greater trouble with social interaction. The results for this main effect should be included in
future research to understand the relationship between social skills and instructor satisfaction.
The results from this study show that creating learning environments with the notion that
increased copresence is best, may not be effective for all students. This study is just the first step
in understanding the types of avatars that influence perceptions of anthropomorphism,
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homophily, and copresence for those with ASD. The findings from this study contribute to a
better understanding of the mechanisms that affect the atypical processing of visual information
and can inform better intervention and education programs.
Study Limitations
There are limitations to this study that influence the interpretation of the findings. First,
this study used an all-male sample; this was systematic and was decided based on previous
research findings regarding the use of the Autism Spectrum Quotient. However, this does limit
the interpretations made from this work. The findings do show that males may require less self
and other-copresence in mediated learning with an avatar. Increased self and other-copresence
may be beneficial for females. Previous research has shown that males and females with ASD
present differently and thereby there needs for copresence may vary as well. Future work should
include females as both the instructor and student to compare and contrast those results with the
findings from this study. Women present differently than men on the autism spectrum, and thus
the results may vary for them. Women may prefer a greater sense of presence in learning
interactions.
The Autism Spectrum Quotient captures the degree to which an individual identifies with
the autistic phenotype. However, as this study indicates, and others before it (Palmer et al., 2014;
Rourke & McGloin, 2019), this is not a unidimensional construct. The three-factor solution
proposed by this work is consistent with other studies that have tested the AQ factor structure
(Rourke & McGloin, 2019). Furthermore, there is a male bias that is present in the current
measure that makes it difficult to capture how females vary. Individuals on the autism spectrum
vary on each of these dimensions, and women specifically show different results. Future
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researchers should examine these sub-dimensions and develop a more robust tool that will more
accurately capture females and males that identify with this phenotype.
Next, because this study only recruited male participants and the avatars both used a male voice,
the effect for this variable may be different if female participants were included in the sample.
The participants may have felt they were similar to the avatar based on gender matching.
Therefore, future studies should include both male and female participants, as well as
instructors.
Finally, this study used information about the environmental protection agency.
Participants and instructors may find that increased social potential and presence are more
effective with different objectives or goals in mind. The goals set out for this study were clear in
trying to identify the need for increased social presence when task-related information was
present. Future studies could look at the importance of increased social potential and copresence
when the focus is on social skills training or group learning. Finally, research in mediated
education could benefit from an exploration into a broader range of design variables for all
individuals that have trouble in processing and responding to multiple streams of information.
Conclusion
The growing population of individuals with an ASD diagnosis and attention deficit
disorders, demands that researchers consider this unique population when investigating
communication processes and technology use. Previous research has not yet addressed the
differences that exist for information processing within this specific population. Finally, this area
of research creates many opportunities to develop interventions utilizing mediated
communication. Individuals with ASD typically struggle with detecting and interpreting social
cues, but avatars and repetitive mediated interactions may help to develop these skills. Engineers
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and researchers in robotics have provoked social behaviors using robots for interaction. Research
in mediated communication and avatars could make these types of interventions more costeffective and accessible for those with ASD. Researchers acknowledge that a "universally
usable" interface focused on the abilities of special needs users may lead to interfaces that are
easier to use for the benefit of all users (Schneiderman, 2000). The findings from this study, and
future communication studies, including those with ASD, could inform better design for
intervention programs and applications targeting social skills and development as well as
education.
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Appendicies
Appendix A: Study Stimuli
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Appendix B: Avatar Script

On Feb 15th, 2017
Just barely a month into the 115th Congress—Republicans held an oversight hearing in the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW) titled, “Modernization of the
Endangered Species Act.” Of course, anyone who has followed Congress in recent years knows
that this is simply a politically clever way of describing what will in reality be a hearing to
discuss how to weaken or repeal the Endangered Species Act altogether.
Why is this important?
The Endangered Species Act has lists of protected plant and animal species both nationally and
worldwide. As of October 2009, 1,361 plants and animals in the United States were listed as
threatened or endangered. There are many additional species that are currently being evaluated
for possible protection under the ESA.
Whether or not a species is listed as endangered or threatened then depends on a number of
factors, including the urgency and whether adequate protections exist through other means.
Has a large percentage of the species vital habitat been degraded or destroyed?
Has the species been over-consumed by commercial, recreational, scientific or
educational uses?
Is the species threatened by disease or predation?
Do current regulations or legislations inadequately protect the species?
Are there other manmade factors that threaten the long-term survival of the species?

58

If scientific research reveals that the answer to one or more of the above questions is yes, then
the species can be listed under the Endangered Species Act.
Once a species becomes listed as "endangered" or "threatened," it receives special
protections by the federal government. Animals are protected from “take” or being traded or
sold. A listed plant is protected if on federal property or if federal actions are involved, such as
the issuing of a federal permit on private land.
The Endangered Species Act is very important, because it saves our native fish, plants
and wildlife from going extinct. Once they are gone, they are gone forever and there is no going
back. Losing even a single species can have disastrous impacts on the rest of the ecosystem,
because the effects will be felt throughout the food chain. From providing cures to deadly
diseases to maintaining natural ecosystems and improving overall quality of life, the benefits of
preserving threatened and endangered species are invaluable.
Here are a few species that have been saved due to the endangered species act:
In the 1960s, a mere 500 bald eagles could be found soaring across America's lower 48
states. By the late 1960's, only 400 breeding pairs of bald eagles were found in the lower 48
states. The outlook was not good for our national symbol. Thanks to the protections afforded by
the Endangered Species Act, bald eagle numbers have rebounded to more than 7,000 breeding
pairs of bald eagles today.
A 1989 census indicated that the Florida panther population had dropped to between 30
to 50 individuals. Today, the species population is still below 100 individuals, but without
Endangered Species Act protections the panther would likely be extinct.
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Gray wolves once ranged across the entire North American continent. However, by the
mid-20th century, only a few hundred of the species remained in the entire lower 48 states.
Today, thanks to Endangered Species Act protections, more than 2,500 wolves reside in
Minnesota, roughly 500 wolves in Wisconsin and Michigan and another 500 individuals in
western states.
These are just a few of the animals that have been saved from extinction. Many more plants and
animals can be saved with continued support of this vital act.
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Appendix C: Pretest Avatars
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Appendix D: Pretest Questionnaire
Anthropomorphism
Nowak, 2006
Seven point Likert scale.
1. This image looks human
2. This image has human features
3. This image has human-like expressions
4. This image is life-like
5. This mage looks very realistic
6. This image looks very cartoon like

Masculinity and Femininity
Seven point Likert scale.
1. This avatar looks masculine
2. This avatar loos feminine

Realism
Nowak, Hamilton, & Hammond, 2009
Four bipolar adjectives on a seven point interval:
1. Real to Not Real
2. Cartoon-like to Photorealistic
3. Natural to Artificial
4. Possible to Impossible (in response to: ‘‘Do you think this image could possibly exist
outside the computer screen.’’).
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Appendix E: Tables
Table 1 Pretest Descriptives
95% Confidence Interval for Mean
N

M

SD

SE

ANTHRO 1

177

5.95

.677

.051

5.85

6.05

2

177

2.81

.850

.064

2.69

2.94

3

180

2.25

.987

.074

2.10

2.39

4

180

3.33

1.242

.093

3.15

3.51

Total

714

3.58

1.711

.064

3.45

3.70

1

175

3.09

.971

.073

2.95

3.24

2

175

5.64

1.094

.083

5.47

5.80

3

177

2.68

.946

.071

2.54

2.82

4

177

3.00

.930

.070

2.86

3.13

Total

704

3.60

1.539

.058

3.48

3.71

REAL
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Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Table 2
Multiple Comparisons of Avatar Anthropomorphism
(I) Avatar
(J) Avatar
Mean Difference
SE
(I-J)

p

Human

Manatee
3.1
.102
.000
Dolphin
3.7
.102
.000
Gorilla
2.6
.102
.000
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = lower limit.
*p < .001

Table 3
Multiple Comparisons of Avatar Realism
(I) Avatar
(J)Avatar
Mean Difference
SE
p
(I-J)
Human
Manatee
-2.5
.106
.000
Dolphin
.41
.105
.001
Gorilla
.10
.105
1.0
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = lower limit.
*p = .001
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95% CI
LL
2.86
3.43
2.35

UL
3.14
3.97
2.89

95 % CI
LL
UL
-2.82
-2.26
.13
.69
-.18
.38

Table 4:
Scale Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-item Correlations
Factor
Social Skills

Item

r

M

3.9
AQ15
AQ17
AQ22
AQ26
AQ38
AQ44
AQ47

.25

Factor
Homophily

Item
HOM2
HOM3
HOM4
HOM5
HOM7

.56
.73
.45
.45
.80
.76
.74

Attention
Switching

r

OCOP1
OCOP2
OCOP7
OCOP8
OCOP10
OCOP11
OCOP1

.08

.66
.56
.68
.45
.61
3.2

AQ3
AQ8
AQ14
AQ27
AQ31
AQ36
AQ40
AQ50
AQ36

.47
.58
.51
.66
.55
.58
.56
.54
.58

Anthropomorphis
m

SRCOP1
SRCOP2
SRCOP3
SRCOP4
SRCOP5
SRCOP1

.53
.75
.79
.76
.74
.53

INEFF1
INEFF2
INEFF3

.57
.65
.79

INEFF4
INEFF5
INEFF6
INEFF7
INEFF8

.73
.61
.73
.59
.73

Instructor
Satisfaction

3.7
ANTHRO1
ANTHRO2
ANTHRO3
ANTHRO4
ANTHRO5
ANTHRO1
ANTHRO2

.10

.14

.84
.78
.67
.72
.85
.84
.78
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SD

3.9

.02

4.2

.03

4.5

.01

4.0

.04

.64
.65
.73
.75
.71
.59
.64

Self Co Presence
Mentalizing

M

.60
.46
.45
.59
.60

Other Co Presence

3.5
AQ10
AQ25
AQ32
AQ34
AQ37

SD

Table 5
ANOVA Results for AQ

AQSS

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum
of
Squares
111.01
454.09
565.10

AQAS

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

58.98
433.30
492.28

1
402
403

58.98
1.08

54.72

.000

AQMENT Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

59.76
329.56
389.32

1
400
401

59.76
.82

72.54

.000

Predictor

df

Mean Square
111.01
1.13

98.28

.000

-1
1

Mean
3.36
4.41

SD
1.07
1.06

95 % CI
LL
UL
3.12
3.51
4.27
4.55

191
213

-1
1

3.10
3.87

.851
1.18

2.89
3.71

3.22
4.03

191
211

-1
1

2.80
3.57

.789
1.00

2.69
3.44

2.91
3.71

AQAS

AQMENT

AQSS

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = lower limit.
(-1 = No ASD, 1 = ASD diagnosis)
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p

1
402
403

Table 6
Comparisons of ASD Participants and Non ASD on AQ
N
191
213

F

Table 7
Means for DV’s by Condition
Dependent Variable COND
ANTHRO
1
2
HOM
1
2
SRCOP
1
2
OCOP
1
2
INSAT
1
2

Mean
Std. Error
3.273
.102
3.955
.104
3.735
.081
3.976
.082
4.401
.093
4.517
.094
4.263
.086
4.084
.087
3.913
.092
4.051
.094

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
3.072
3.475
3.751
4.159
3.576
3.893
3.816
4.137
4.219
4.583
4.332
4.702
4.094
4.433
3.913
4.256
3.731
4.094
3.867
4.235

Table 8a:
Pairwise Comparisons
Dependent Variable: ANTHRO
95% Confidence Interval for
Mean
Differenceb
Difference (I(I) ASD (J) ASD
J)
Std. Error
Sig.b Lower Bound Upper Bound
-1
1
-1.088*
.142
.000
-1.368
-.809
*
1
-1
1.088
.142
.000
.809
1.368
Based on estimated marginal means
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no
adjustments).
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Table 8b:
Pairwise Comparisons
Dependent Variable: ANTHRO
Mean
Difference (IJ)
Std. Error

95% Confidence Interval for
Differenceb
Sig.b

(I) COND

(J) COND

Lower Bound Upper Bound

1

2

-.741*

.142

.000

-1.021

-.461

2

1

.741*

.142

.000

.461

1.021

Based on estimated marginal means
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no
adjustments).
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Table 9
Means for DV’s by Diagnosis
Dependent Variable ASD
ANTHRO
-1
1
HOM
-1
1
SRCOP
-1
1
OCOP
-1
1
INSAT
-1
1

Mean
Std. Error
3.108
.103
4.120
.103
3.869
.081
3.842
.081
4.153
.093
4.765
.094
4.163
.087
4.185
.087
4.060
.093
3.903
.093

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
2.906
3.311
3.917
4.323
3.710
4.028
3.682
4.002
3.970
4.336
4.581
4.949
3.992
4.333
4.014
4.356
3.878
4.243
3.720
4.086

Table 10
Correlation Matrix
1
2
3
4
1. AQ
2. COND
-.00
3. AQAS
.35**
-.07
4. AQSS
.44**
-.01
.59**
5. AQMENT
.39**
-.05
.72**
.51**
6. ANTHRO
.35**
.24**
-.00
.21**
7. HOM
- .00
.11*
-.10*
.04
8. SRCOP
.24**
.07
.03
.18**
9. OCOP
.04
-.05
-.21** -.10*
10.
-.04
.07
-17** -21**
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed)
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
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5

-.03
-.17**
.01
-.18**
-11*

6

7

8

.15**
.40**
.19**
-.01

.00
.13**
.15**

-.11*
-.30**

9

.57**

10

-

Appendix F: Figures
Figure 1: Hypothesis 1
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Figure 2: Hypothesis 2a
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Figure 3: Hypothesis 2b
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Figure 4: Hypothesis 3
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Figure 5: Hypothesis 4a
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Figure 6: Hypothesis 4c
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Figure 7: Hypothesis 6a
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Figure 8: Hypothesis 6c
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Figure 9: Hypothesis 8a
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Figure 10: Hypothesis 8c
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